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Abstract 
The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents 
an important institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the 
courts, the 2007 overhaul of the approach and methodology has increased the 
scope of competition policy towards sports associations and clubs. Nowadays, 
virtually all activities of sports associations that govern and organize a sports 
discipline with business elements are subject to antitrust rules. This includes 
genuine sporting rules that are essential for a league, championship or tourna-
ment to come into existence. Of course, ‘real’ business or commercial activities 
like ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting rights, etc. also have to comply 
with competition rules. 
 
Regulatory activities of sports associations comply with European competition 
rules if they pursuit a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are inherent to 
that objective and proportionate to it. This new approach offers important orien-
tation for the strategy choice of sports associations, clubs and related enter-
prises. Since this assessment is done following a case-by-case approach, how-
ever, neither a blacklist of anticompetitive nor a whitelist of procompetitive 
sporting rules can be derived. Instead, conclusions can be drawn only from the 
existing case decisions – but, unfortunately, this leaves many aspects open. 
With respect to business activities, the focus of European competition policy is 
on centralized marketing arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute 
cartels and are viewed to be anticompetitive in nature. However, they may be 
exempted from the cartel prohibition on efficiency and consumer benefits con-
siderations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that centralized marketing 
arrangements must comply with in order to be legal. Although this policy seems 
to be well-developed at first sight, a closer look at the decision practice reveals 
several open problems. Other areas of the buying and selling behavior of sports 
associations and related enterprises are considerably less well-developed and do 
not provide much orientation for business. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing commercialization of sports has turned (at least) professional 
sports more and more into a business. With the increasing weight of economic 
activities in the context of sport, however, the sports ‘industry’ came under the 
jurisdiction of competition rules. Although many sports clubs and associations 
do not view themselves to be business companies, it has long been established 
in legal sciences that economic activities in the context of sport do fall within 
the scope of EC competition rules and law (European Commission 2007b: 63). 
This represents long-standing practice and is confirmed by the European 
Courts.1 Similarly, the question whether individual athletes, sports clubs, na-
tional and international sports association are undertakings or enterprises in the 
sense of EC law has been comprehensively answered in the affirmative as soon 
as they pursue economic activities in the broadest sense and irrespective of any 
formal status of professional vs. amateur sports (European Commission 2007b: 
66-67).  
 
Competition rules shape the strategic behavior of sports clubs and associations 
when it comes to economic activities (in a broad understanding), defining what 
types of business behavior is allowed and what not. Thus, compliance with 
competition rules as a considerable part of the institutional framework for doing 
business represents an important element for and constraint on strategy devel-
opment and choice. Therefore, it is relevant for sports business to understand 
the underlying principles and policy practices of European competition authori-
ties, so that strategy and management can be shaped in compliance with compe-
tition rules. This requires specialized research because the sports sector differs 
significantly from other, more ‘ordinary’ industries (Smith & Stewart 2010; 
Dietl 2010) – and this is recognized by the relevant competition authorities in 
                                                          
1  Relevant decisions date back to the 1970s and the famous Bosman judgment (1995) also plays 
an important role. See for the most recent confirmation the judgment of the CFI in the Meca-
Medina case. Naturally, the same applies for other business rules under EC law such as the in-
ternal market and free movement rules. 
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Europe. Consequently, the European Commission (EC) – in its Directorate-
Generals Competition and Education & Culture – has developed a sector-
specific interpretation and application of the general competition rules of the 
European Union. This policy also influences the policy of the National Compe-
tition Authorities (NCAs) that (i) directly apply EU law to national cases and 
(ii) are bringing the execution of national competition rules in line with EC pol-
icy through the European Competition Network (ECN) (Budzinski & 
Christiansen 2005). 
 
Unlike the U.S., where antitrust policy in sport business represents a frequently 
discussed issue,2 there is comparatively little literature on competition policy in-
terventions into sports markets in Europe. Furthermore, the existing discussion 
is predominantly driven by legal sciences and lacks a sports management per-
spective. This is particularly true with regard to 2007-overhaul of the sector-
specific attitude to applying competition rules in sports.3 The paper systemati-
cally outlines the underlying principles and practices of EC competition policy 
in the sports sector, thus, providing important information and orientation for 
sports management (section 2). It illustrates this by discussing two major cases 
and its implications for sports business and points to open problems and some 
inconsistencies in the application of competition rules to sports (section 3). In 
doing so, the paper contributes to filling a gap in the sports management litera-
ture. 
                                                          
2  See Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Pelnar 2007; DePasquale 2009; Kahn 2009; Keyte & Eckles 
2009; Loptaka 2009; Winfree 2009; Zimbalist 2009; Feldman 2010; Grow 2010; Hovenkamp 
2010; Rascher 2010 for a selection of recent contributions. 
3  See Robertson 2002; Papaloukas 2005; Santa Maria 2005; Weatherill 2006, 2007; Cygan 
2007a, 2007b; Massey 2007; Szyszczak 2007 for legal analyses, however, predominantly refer-
ring to the pre-2007 White Paper policy. To my best knowledge, the existing economic litera-
ture on European antitrust issues (see, inter alia, Ross 2003; Budzinski & Satzer 2010; Syz-
manski 2010 and the literature cited therein; Lyons 2009) does not explicitly deal with the post-
2007 EC competition policy. 
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2. European Competition Rules for Sports Business 
2.1. European Competition Rules and Case Overview 
European competition policy in the broad sense consists of the competition 
provisions and policies on the community level (European competition policy 
in the narrow sense) and the ones on the level of the Member States (national 
competition policy). The community level provides rules for enterprise coop-
eration (cartel policy), abusive strategies of enterprises with a powerful market 
position (abuse control), mergers and acquisitions (merger control) and public 
subsidies for enterprises (state aid policy). Without going into detail,4  
 
 cartel policy (Art. 101 TFEU)5 generally prohibits any agreement between 
independent enterprises, especially the coordination of prices and quanti-
ties, the division of markets as well as discriminatory and boycott ar-
rangements, unless the enterprise cooperation cumulatively fulfills five 
criteria: (i) increases efficiency of production or distribution, (ii) pro-
motes technical or economic progress, (iii) allows consumers a fair share 
of the benefits, (iv) imposes no unnecessary restrictions on competition (= 
the benefits must be cartel-specific) and (v) does not eliminate competi-
tion in a substantial part of the products in question, 
 abuse control (Art. 102 TFEU)6 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position 
in any market, 
 merger control (Art. 2 (2) ECMR)7 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that 
lead to a significant impediment of effective competition, and 
                                                          
4  For a contemporary and comprehensive analysis see for instance Bishop & Walker (2010). 
5  Treaty oft he Functioning of the European Union (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF; retrieved 
2010-12-06 at 16.01); formerly Art. 81 EC. 
6  Formerly Art. 82 EC. 
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 state aid policy (Art. 107 ff. TFEU) generally prohibits distortive aids for 
enterprises by national or regional governments or governmental organi-
zations. 
 
Out of these policy fields, only merger policy has not yet been a relevant prob-
lem in the sport sector. Therefore, there is no special Commission policy on 
sports mergers so far.8 According to the Commission website,9 most cases have 
been handled under EU antitrust rules, which comprises cartel policy and abuse 
control. Thus, this article will accordingly focus on these policy areas. 
 
The competition rules in the Member States can differ considerably from the 
community rules and – to put it very simplified10 – apply to cases that are purely 
national or regional. If the community rules are applicable, however, national 
decisions must stand in line with European competition policy in the narrow 
sense. National cases do have some importance in the sports industry. However, 
due to the large variety in 27 Member States and due to space restrictions, this 
                                                          
7  European Commission Merger Regulation (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:EN:PDF; retrieved 
2010-12-06 at 16.17). 
8  The appendix lists the EU case history. Most of the hitherto mergers concerned private equity 
companies acquiring commercial rights holders of sports event. Only one concentration – the 
CVC-SLEC merger – raised anticompetitive concerns as so far it was about to merge the com-
mercial rights of the biggest four-wheel motor racing world championship with the biggest 
two-wheel one. A divestiture commitment to sell the motor cycling rights solved the issue 
(European Commission 2006). Furthermore, mergers between sports clubs have not occurred 
frequently in a professional or business context so far (perhaps with the exception of the Super-
ligaen, the Danish premier football league) and mergers between sports associations have 
merely occurred on a national level without community dimension so far. It is somewhat 
likely, however, that merger policy will gain importance in the sports sector with the ongoing 
commercialization of sports business. 
9  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html; retrieved 2010-12-06 at 
16.09). 
10  For a more comprehensive analysis of the complex competence delineation and allocation rules 
see for instance Budzinski (2006). 
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article cannot include them systematically. Thus, it will concentrate on Euro-
pean competition policy in the narrow sense. 
 
The appendix provides an overview over the competition cases handled by the 
Commission. The early cases have often been based on internal market rules 
with the notable exceptions of the landmark Formula One case (see section 3.2) 
and centralized marketing cases (see section 3.3). Since the 2007 Meca-Medina 
ruling, however, virtually all areas of sports business have become directly sub-
ject to competition rules, including apparently genuine sporting activities like 
defining, developing and enforcing the regulatory framework of a sports disci-
pline’s major championships, leagues and tournaments (see sections 2.2 and 
3.1). Although the sheer case number does not seem to be too overwhelming, 
the Commission, on its website, cites sports business as one among only 13 in-
dustries that deserve special antitrust attention.11 
 
The antitrust cases within the sports sector can be classified into three catego-
ries: 
 
I. the internal regulation of sport (genuine sporting rules or the rules of the 
game), 
II. business practices (buying and selling behavior of sports enterprises, like 
ticketing arrangements, exclusivity contracts, etc), and 
III. the sale of broadcasting rights12 (in particular the practice of bundling and 
joint-selling of the rights and the centralized marketing of a league or a 
championship). 
                                                          
11  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html. 
12  Systematically, the sale of broadcasting rights would belong to the selling behavior of sports 
enterprises and, thus, to the business practices category. However, due to the outstanding vol-
umes and importance of this business for some sports, the Commission treats these cases as a 
separate category. 
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2.2. Principles of EU Competition Policy towards Sports Business  
The principles of EU competition policy in sports markets have been outlined in 
the context of the 2007 White Paper on Sport (European Commission 2007a) by 
the accompanying staff paper on the background and context of the Commis-
sion policy in the sports sector (European Commission 2007b). Although this 
paper aims to provide guidance for sports business (addressing both sports as-
sociations and sports clubs) it does not constitute official competition policy 
guidelines (European Commission 2007b: 63), i.e. it does not possess a binding 
character for Commission decisions. Thus, it falls short of being a sports-
specific interpretation of competition law and merely represents a policy notice. 
However, it can be expected that the Commission will actually practice accord-
ing to the outlined concepts and procedures. 
2.2.1. Taking Account of the Special Characteristics of Sport  
The Commission acknowledges that sports business entails several special 
characteristics distinguishing this industry and the related markets from ‘ordi-
nary business’ (Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005: 74-75; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6-
7). Explicitly, four specificities of sport are enlisted (ibid.). 
 
Firstly, the interdependence between competing adversaries refers to the basic 
sports economic insight that the competitors in any league or championship de-
pend on each other in order to achieve a viable business. In stark contrast to 
‘ordinary’ industries “where competition serves the purpose of eliminating inef-
ficient firms from the market, sport clubs and athletes have a direct interest (..) 
in there being other clubs and athletes” (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6). Any league 
or championship requires a sufficient number of entries (competitors) for a sus-
tainable existence. 
 
Secondly, the need to preserve the uncertainty of results somewhat mixes two 
different principles.  On the one hand, it includes the ‘integrity of competition’, 
a principle that is related to the absence of match-fixing, doping, etc. (Lind-
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ström-Rossi et al. 2005: 74). On the other hand, the ‘uncertainty of outcome’ 
principle (following the similarly named famous hypothesis from sports eco-
nomics; Neale 1964), leads to the “requirement of a certain degree of equality 
or, in other words, competitive balance” (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6).13 In con-
trast to the basic interdependence between competitors, i.e. the existence of a 
sufficient number of competitors, competitive balance refers to a sufficient 
sporting and economic viability of the competitors in order to create a close and 
sustainable fight for wins and championships. 
 
Thirdly, the freedom of internal organization of sport associations is high-
lighted. Sport is typically organized by a ‘monopolistic pyramid structure’, i.e. 
“a single national sport association per sport and Member State, which operates 
under the umbrella of a single European and a single worldwide federation” 
(Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 7). It is not completely clear, however, whether – by 
referring to the ‘often required existence of one umbrella organization’ – this 
specificity represents an analogue to the American notion of the ‘single-entity 
cooperation’, i.e. cooperative actions that are essential and indispensable for the 
pure (sporting) existence of a league or championship. If it is meant to highlight 
the essential regulatory task of sports associations, setting the rules of a game, 
then a more specific or narrower definition of the monopolistic bottleneck 
within the organization of sports business would be required. While both the 
concepts of the single-entity cooperation and the regulatory minimum tasks 
drive the conclusion of a monopoly of regulatory power in a given league or 
championship, these concepts do not automatically preclude the necessary ab-
sence of rival leagues or championships (under the same ‘umbrella’ or under 
                                                          
13  Already the founding father of sports economics as a discipline, Rottenberg (1956: 242), 
claimed that the “nature of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximate equal 
‘size’ if any are to be successful; this seems to be a unique attribute of professional competitive 
sports” as well as “no team can be successful unless its competitors also survive and prosper 
sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of the play among teams are not ‘too great’”. 
However, modern sports economic insight takes a more cautious approach: “It is simply not the 
case that competitive balance is either necessary or sufficient to increase the popularity of a 
sport” (Szymanski 2006: 31). 
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different ‘umbrellas’), for instance. The FIA case (section 3.2) provides ample 
indication of the problems of a lack of clarity in this issue. 
 
Fourthly, preserving the educational, public health, social, cultural and recrea-
tional functions of sport, the ‘principle of solidarity’, represents a somewhat 
non-economic community objective. Furthermore, it remains rather unclear 
what concrete implications must be derived from the inclusion of this principle 
apart from sports ‘requiring’ a certain degree of arrangements which provide for  
redistribution of financial resources from professional to amateur and youth 
levels of sport (Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005: 75; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6-7). 
2.2.2. Genuine Sporting Rules, Business Activities and Competitive Ef-
fects 
From the special characteristics of sports, namely from the single-entity coop-
eration concept and the essential regulatory task of sports associations, it can be 
inferred that the activities of sports associations can be distinguished in setting 
and implementing genuine sporting rules and conducting business activities. 
Conceptually, genuine sporting rules would refer to the rules of the game, the 
schedule and structure of the championship and other activities (including the 
enforcement of the rules) that are essential to generate a sportingly viable 
league or championship. Examples include the length of the game, the number 
of players, the design of the off-side rule, sanctioning rule violators, etc. in 
European football. These activities can be viewed as being non-business in na-
ture and purely sporting. In contrast, activities like bundling and selling broad-
casting rights, market a league or championship product, ticketing arrange-
ments, contracts with equipment suppliers, etc. are not essential for a league or 
championship to come into existence and represent business activities. Follow-
ing this distinction, a manifest policy consequence would be to apply (eco-
nomic) competition rules only to business activities and generally exempt genu-
ine sporting rules. In the times before the landmark Meca-Medina ruling of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006, the Commission and the European 
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courts appear to have embraced this conceptual differentiation (Lindström-Rossi 
et al. 2005). 
 
However, there is an obvious problem with the non-business character of genu-
ine sporting rules. Sports associations can shape these rules with a view to in-
crease the attractiveness of the sport in order to maximize fan numbers (and 
revenues) and, thus, pursue a business motivation with the design of the sport-
ing rules, generating economic effects. While in some cases it might rather clear 
that a rule change or the introduction of a new rule serves the business interest 
rather than the sport, it is practically impossible to draw a strict delineation be-
tween genuine sporting rules and business activities.14 The ECJ implicitly em-
braced this insight in Meca-Medina. Two professional long-distance swimmers 
challenged the anti-doping rules of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
under articles 81 and 82 EC (now 101 and 102 TFEU). By setting too low 
threshold for the relevant substances and handing out excessive penalties for 
violations, the IOC was alleged to restrict competition and abusing its monop-
oly power. While the ECJ rejected the complaint in question, it took the oppor-
tunity of this judgement to rule that there is no category of purely sporting rules 
that are a priori not subject to the application of competition rules. Instead, the 
court clarified that if the underlying sporting activity constitutes an economic 
activity (i.e. includes business elements), then the conditions for participation 
also fall within the scope of European competition rules.15 As a consequence, 
the following three-step methodology to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to 
sports business has been developed (European Commission 2007b: 65-69; 
Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 8). 
 
                                                          
14  For instance, it is undoubtedly essential to define the length of a match (in football, etc.). How-
ever, making the match lasting longer or shorter, playing gross or net time or the number, fre-
quency and scheduling of breaks might well be decided and shaped according to the attractive-
ness for television broadcasting and, thus, according to business interests. Think about the in-
troduction of extra breaks for commercials, for instance. 
15  On Meca-Medina and its line of reasoning see Weatherill (2006, 2007), European Commission 
(2007b), Kienapfel & Stein (2007) and Szyszczak (2007). 
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Step 1: Are Articles 101 and 102 TFEU applicable to the sporting rule? This 
requires that (1a) the rule-setting sports association is either an undertaking or 
an association of undertakings, (1b) the rule in question either restricts compe-
tition (Art. 101 (1) TFEU) or constitutes an abuse of a dominant position (Art. 
102 TFEU), and (1c) that trade between the Member States is affected. 
 
Step 1 probably represents the easiest part of the assessment due to the special 
characteristics of sports business (see section 2.2.1). A governing sports asso-
ciation falls under the legal undertaking or enterprise concept (1a) as soon as 
the regulated sports discipline (or the regulated league, championship or tour-
nament) includes business elements (some types of money flows). Apart from 
very amateur sports, this will be the case for virtually all sports events, espe-
cially of course for premier-level sports as well as other professional and semi-
professional sports. Virtually all rules defined and enforced by any sports asso-
ciation in its essential function as a regulatory, governing body will influence 
the comparative competitiveness of the participants, the conditions of participa-
tion or other elements of competition and, in this regard, (potentially) ‘restrict’ 
competition in one way or the other (1b). In this regard, sporting competition 
and economic competition are inextricably intertwined in sports business since 
the essential regulation of sports events inevitably influences their attractive-
ness and, thus, includes a business dimension. Due to the monopolistic pyramid 
structure of sports associations (see section 2.2.1), a dominant position should 
always be easy to establish.16 Eventually, the geographic jurisdictional criterion 
(1c) determines the competence allocation between the Commission and the 
Member States. 
 
Step 2: Does the sporting rule infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU? The sport-
ing rule falls outside the prohibition of these provisions if (2a) the rule pursues 
a legitimate objective, (2b) its restrictive effects are inherent in the pursuit of 
that objective, and (2c) proportionate to it. 
                                                          
16  In the ‘ordinary’ industry, establishing the existence of a dominant position is a difficult and 
usually controversial task. 
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“[A]nticompetitive sporting rules which are inherent in the organisation and 
proper conduct of sport and proportionate do not infringe Articles 81 (1) or 82 
EC (...)” (European Commission 2007b: 63). Legitimate objectives (2a) usually 
relate to the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport. This may 
include (European Commission 2007b: 68) ensuring fair sport competitions 
with equal chances for all athletes, ensuring the uncertainty of results by the ab-
sence of match-fixing, the protection of the athletes’ health, protecting the 
safety of the spectators, the encouragement of training of young athletes, ensur-
ing of financial stability of sport clubs/teams, the rules of the game (ensuring 
uniform and consistent exercise of a given sport), etc. This list is not meant to 
be complete. It just provides some typical examples. 
 
“The restrictions caused by a sporting rule must be inherent in the pursuit of its 
objective” (2b) (European Commission 2007b: 68). It remains rather unclear 
whether this condition is already satisfied if a sporting rule is suited to achieve 
the legitimate objective or whether it must be necessary to achieve the legiti-
mate objective. The second variant would be the stricter one, demanding that 
without the sporting rule (or its intended change) the legitimate objective would 
be failed. In many cases, in particular when addressing rules changes, the ‘new’ 
rule may fail to be necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in the sense that 
the ‘old’ rule did so, too. However, the ‘new’ rule may improve the spectacle 
with the same degree of objective achievement. Still, this rules change would be 
considered an infringement under the ‘necessary’ interpretation of ‘inherent’. In 
contrast, the first interpretation offers considerably more leeway for sports as-
sociations’ business strategies since all rules ‘suited’ to achieve the legitimate 
objective do not infringe competition rules. From a business perspective, the 
‘suited’ interpretation of ‘inherent’ might be advantageous because it is neutral 
to the historical chronology of sporting rules design whereas the ‘necessary’ in-
terpretation tends to cement the ‘original’ rule. 
 
 
18 
Eventually, the ‘proportionate’ condition (2c) demands the competition restric-
tion by the sporting rule to be not more restrictive than necessary and applied in 
a transparent, objective and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
Step 3: Does the rule fulfil the exemption conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU or 
does an objective justification make it compatible with Article 102 TFEU?  
 
As outlined in section 2.1, an infringement of Article 101 (1) TFEU can be ex-
empted from prohibition if five criteria are fulfilled (see there). Likewise, an in-
fringement of Article 102 TFEU can be compatible with competition if an ob-
jective justification exists. So, even if a sporting rule is not inherent in the or-
ganisation or proper conduct of sport, it can be compatible with competition 
rules if a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects (according to 
the respective criteria of Article 101 (3) TFEU) comes to the conclusion that the 
beneficial (procompetitive) effects outweigh the restrictive effects.  
 
In line with the general trend in European competition policy, the Commission 
insists on a case-by-case analysis of each sporting rule in question. According 
to the Commission (European Commission 2007b: 69), it is neither possible to 
predetermine an exhaustive blacklist of anticompetitive sporting rules, nor to 
provide a whitelist of unproblematic sporting rules. The only source for this 
type of knowledge is previously decided cases and, naturally, they offer merely 
an accidental selection of rule types. The case-by-case approach offers the ad-
vantage of deciding each case on its own merits but the disadvantage of not 
providing much guidance for business behaviour. 
2.2.3. Business Practices of Sports Clubs and Associations 
Next to the internal regulation of sport and its intertwined business elements, 
there is an area where sports business conducts more ‘ordinary’ business behav-
ior, namely buying and selling behavior. Here, competition rules generally ap-
ply in the ‘normal’ way, i.e. the special characteristics of sports usually do not 
play a role. Examples include the equipment buying behavior of individual 
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sports clubs or their ticket selling practices as well as the competitive behavior 
of sports-related enterprises like equipment producers.17  
 
So far, specific competition concerns have occurred in the context of sports 
events where the federation as the principal organizer has engaged in buying 
and selling behavior – namely the football world cups. More precisely, the tick-
eting arrangements for these events have been scrutinized and serve as the only 
source for principles in this area so far (European Commission 2007b: 89-92). 
Basically, two different competition problems have been identified: (a) dis-
criminatory sales systems (territorial restrictions for the 1998 World Cup) and 
(b) exclusivity contracts (travel agency exclusivity for travel-ticket packages to 
the 1990 World Cup; credit card exclusivity for ticket payments in the 2004 
Athens Olympic Games and the 2006 World Cup).  
 
Two principles can be inferred from these cases, namely (i) non-discrimination 
and (ii) reasonable access to tickets. In particular, the Commission insists that 
sufficient alternatives for access have to accompany any exclusive contract. For 
instance, credit card exclusivity requires the existence of either alternative pay-
ment methods (e.g. bank transfer) without dissuasive or prohibitive costs or al-
ternative sales channels free of the exclusivity to one credit card company (e.g. 
exclusivity only for online sales; card freedom for over-the-counter sales). 
 
Whether these principles will guide possible decisions on other types of exclu-
sivity contracts and whether they are appropriate or sufficient in this regard re-
mains open. Especially, the increasing role of advertisement exclusivity con-
tracts in the context of Olympic Games and World Cups (including the ever-
increasing scope of the exclusivity) might be viewed to trigger future investiga-
tions and cases.  
 
                                                          
17  Note that the sports-media interface is treated as a special issue in section 2.2.4. 
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2.2.4. The Special Issue of Broadcasting Rights  
Sport media rights are viewed to be a special issue by the Commission (Euro-
pean Commission 2007b: 78-89; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 10-13) because of 
two reasons. Firstly, due to the extraordinary price increases especially of TV 
broadcasting rights, they are viewed to be one of the main factors driving the 
economic growth of the sports sector. Secondly, sports broadcasting rights are 
viewed to be an important input to media markets. In particular for (pay) televi-
sion markets, certain broadcasting rights represent a premium content that has a 
decisive influence on the competitiveness of a media company. Consequently, 
the concentration of valuable media rights in the hands of very few sports fed-
erations limits their availability and cause competitive concerns for sports and 
media markets (Toft 2006: 3).  
 
A typical phenomenon in sports business is the centralized marketing of a 
league or championship by the governing or regulatory body, a sports associa-
tion. Next to creating a common brand, this centralized marketing strategy typi-
cally includes the bundling of the broadcasting rights in the hands of the associ-
ation and the sale of these rights on behalf of the original rights holders (the 
participants, hosts and promoter of the league or championship). Centralized 
marketing represents a type of joint-selling and constitutes a restriction of com-
petition under Article 101 (1) TFEU, namely a cartel (Toft 2006: 4-6; Kienapfel 
& Stein 2007: 11). In a league, for instance, it prevents the individual clubs 
from competing for television deals, often sets a uniform price (price-fixing), 
often reduces the number of available rights in order to increase the price (ar-
tificial output reduction), leads to market foreclosure in media markets, and can 
hamper the development of certain sub-markets (e.g. new media markets in or-
der to protect pay-TV revenues). Insofar, considerable harm to consumer wel-
fare must be expected. 
 
Next to the considerable anticompetitive effects of the centralized and bundled 
sale of broadcasting rights, the Commission also recognizes procompetitive ef-
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ficiency effects, which may potentially allow for an exemption according to Ar-
ticle 101 (3) TFEU. More precisely, the Commission identifies three types of 
benefits (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 11-12): 
 
 the creation of a single point of sale provides efficiencies by reducing 
transaction costs for clubs and media companies, 
 the creation of a common brand is efficient as it increases recognition and 
distribution of the product, and 
 the creation of a league product may increase its attractiveness for the 
fans (viewers) as the product is focused on the competition as a whole ra-
ther than the individual clubs participating in the competition. 
 
The Commission has taken a skeptical position as to whether these benefits 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects. Following three case decisions, it has es-
tablished the practice that it views the conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU (see 
section 2.1) fulfilled if a couple of ‘remedies’ are implemented in the joint-
selling arrangement (Toft 2006: 7-10; European Commission 2007b: 84-89):  
 
 competitive tendering, i.e. a non-discriminatory and transparent competi-
tive bidding process in order to give all potential buyers an opportunity to 
compete for the broadcasting rights, 
 limitation of the duration of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. employing a 
‘sun-setting mechanism’, according to the current Commission practice in 
football the duration must not exceed three seasons, 
 limitation of the scope of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. unbundling me-
dia rights into several separate packages in order to prevent market forec-
losure (sometimes combined with ‘blind-selling’), for instance, exclusive 
football live rights currently must be separated in at least two balanced 
and meaningful packages, 
 exclusion of conditional bidding, 
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 fall-back option, use obligation and parallel exploitation in order to reme-
dy output restrictions; i.e. unused rights fall back to the individual clubs 
for parallel, competitive exploitation, 
 exceptionally: ‘no single buyer obligation’ in case of already existing 
dominance of one television operator, and 
 trustee supervision of the tender procedure. 
 
Within the area of broadcasting rights, the competition policy of the Commis-
sion is comparatively advanced. The conditions for centralized marketing con-
cepts to fulfill the exemption criteria from the cartel prohibition are outlined in 
a rather clear-cut and unambiguous way, providing appropriate guidance for 
business strategies of sports associations. 
3. The Practice of European Competition Policy in 
Sports Markets: Examples and Comments 
After having laid out the principles of antitrust interventions into sports busi-
ness in Europe in the preceding sections, the paper now addresses additional 
implications from some concrete case decisions. In doing so, it gets clearer how 
the principles work. However, the line of reasoning also reveals some ambigui-
ties in the principles and its application. Section 3.1 provides examples of sport-
ing rules that have been found to be pro- or anticompetitive in the case practice 
so far. Section 3.2 addresses the FIA case in some detail because it still is the 
landmark case regarding abuse of dominance by a sports association. Eventu-
ally, section 3.3 briefly addresses three critical issues in the competition regula-
tion of centralized marketing arrangements. 
3.1. Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Sporting Rules: Examples 
from the Case Practice 
Drawing on the existing case practices (see Appendix I), an indicative list of 
sporting rules that are likely to stand in line with competition rules and comply 
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with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can be derived (European Commission 2007b: 
70-73; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 9). This list has to be viewed with some cau-
tion, however, since the assessment of a specific rule will depend on the con-
crete design and context under a case-by-case approach.  
 
 Entry Rules (the Judo case): In order to manage the inherent limits to the 
number of participants in a tournament, championship or league, the 
competent sports associations needs to define selection criteria. As long 
as they are appropriate to the competition in question as well as non-
arbitrary and non-discriminatory (e.g. following transparent performance 
criteria), entry-restricting rules are likely to meet the criteria legitimate 
objective, inherence and proportionality (see section 2.2.2). 
 ‘Home and Away’ Rule (Mouscron case): Leagues are often organized in 
home- and away-matches between clubs and defining a territorial restric-
tion for ‘home’ is likely to stand in line with the Meca-Medina criteria. 
 Transfer Periods (Lehtonen case): Restriction of the time period through 
which players are allowed to change clubs (transfer windows) may follow 
the legitimate objective to ensure the regularity of competitions (absence 
of ‘artificial’ game-to-game changes in the competitive strength of the 
teams by hiring and firing players). Inherence and proportionality sensi-
tively depend on the concrete design of the transfer window. 
 Nationality Clauses for National Teams: inherent to a meaningful compe-
tition between national teams. 
 Multiple Ownership Rules: Rules preventing that two or more competitors 
in the same league, championship or tournament are owned or managed 
by the same company or person serve the legitimate objective to safe-
guard the uncertainty of outcome and the integrity of competition. 
 Anti-doping Rules (Meca-Medina case): Legitimate objectives here may 
be the integrity of competition and the protection of the health of the par-
ticipants. Inherence and proportionality may depend on the specific de-
sign and context. 
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In addition to these case related conclusions regarding procompetitive sporting 
rules, Kienapfel and Stein (2007: 9) refer to the “elementary rules of a sport 
(e.g. the rules fixing the length of matches or the number of players on the 
field)”. However, the category ‘elementary rules of the game’ will be as diffi-
cult to unambiguously delineate as the ‘purely sporting rule’ concept discarded 
by the ECJ.  
 
In contrast, the following rules and regulatory areas are viewed to be examples 
of rules typically involving serious competition concerns (European Commis-
sion 2007b: 73-76; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 9-10): 
 
 Deterrence of Competition Rules (the FIA case): Rules protecting com-
mercial activities by sports associations from competition are typically 
anticompetitive (see also section 3.2). 
 Exclusive Internal Judiciary Systems (inter alia, FIA and FIFA case). 
Rules excluding legal challenges of decisions by sports associations be-
fore ordinary courts typically violate European antitrust rules. 
 Transfer Payment Systems (Bosman case): Payments for transfers of 
players may only be acceptable within narrow boundaries. In particular, 
mandatory transfer payments for out-of-contract players violate European 
competition and internal market rules. 
 Nationality Rules (Bosman case): Outside national teams’ tournaments, 
restrictions of participants on grounds of citizenship raise serious anti-
competitive effects (and violate internal market rules if EU nationality is 
involved). 
 Restrictions of Professions Ancillary to Sport (the Piau case). Restrictions 
for players’ agents, for instance, must not be arbitrary, overly restrictive 
or otherwise anticompetitive. In the case in question, inter alia the re-
quirement to deposit a bank guarantee in order to obtain an agent’s li-
cense from FIFA was assessed to be anticompetitive. 
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Again, this list has to be dealt with caution since the assessment of a specific 
rule will depend on the concrete design and context under a case-by-case ap-
proach. Furthermore, the discussed rules represent only a small fraction of rele-
vant rules in sports business. 
3.2. Abuse of Regulatory Power: The FIA Case (1999 – 2003) 
Although the FIA case was handled considerably before the 2007 revision of 
the Commission’s competition policy towards sports business, it offers a couple 
of useful insights. The Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) is the 
principal worldwide authority for motor racing. Its members are national motor 
racing associations. Next to being a ‘governing’ sports associations setting and 
governing sporting regulations, the FIA also engaged in commercial promotion 
activities. This was viewed to create a conflict of interests that sets incentives 
for the FIA to abuse its regulatory power in order to protect and increase the 
commercial rents from its self-promoted products and, thus, discriminate 
against and deter products under its authority that are promoted by independent 
agencies. 
 
The Commission prima facie alleged the FIA to abuse its dominant position in 
the market for global motor racing series (‘world championships’) in four ways 
(European Commission 1999; Cygan 2007a: 80-86, 2007b: 1336-1341): 
 
I. the FIA used its power to block series which compete with its own events, 
II. the FIA has used this power to force a competing series out of the market, 
III. the FIA used its power abusively to acquire all the television rights to in-
ternational motor sports events, and 
IV. FIA protect the Formula One (F1) Championship from competition by ty-
ing everything up that is needed to stage a rival championship. 
 
Allegations (I) and (IV) deal with the issue of deterring competitive threats to 
flagship championships of FIA by tying up the essential factors for organizing 
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and promoting a rival series. More precisely, it refers to FIA’s contractual and 
licensing practices which usually included an exclusive commitment to the FIA 
series and threatened withdrawal of the participation right in FIA flagship 
championships in case of any engagement in rival series. For instance, contracts 
with circuit owners prevented circuits used for F1 Grand Prix races from being 
used for races that could compete with F1. The so-called Concorde Agreement 
(the basic contract constituting the F1 world championship) prevented F1 teams 
from participating in any rival series and contracts with broadcasters included 
significant fines in case they broadcasted anything deemed by FIA’s commer-
cial rights management to be a competitive threat. (II) refers to evidence that 
FIA abused its monopoly position as a regulator to force a competing promoter 
out of the market. The GTR organization had successfully promoted a sports 
car championship (Gran Turismo, GT), which – after driving them out of the 
market by denying access to circuits, drivers, teams, etc. – then was replaced by 
a similar championship under FIA promotion (FIA GT Championship). Hence, 
the double role of FIA (and its associated companies) as a monopoly regulator 
and a competitor in the promoter market played an important role. Allegation 
(II) refers to a new FIA rule from 1995 claiming the television rights to all mo-
tor sports events under its authority. This implied that promoters competing 
with FIA (and its associated companies) were forced to assign the television 
rights to their competitor (which was also the regulatory monopolist). In eco-
nomic terms, the allegations against FIA rested on (i) exclusive contracts in-
cluding prohibitive sanctions with essential factors of production as well as (ii) 
leveraging the monopoly power from being the governing sports association 
into the promoter market. Both anticompetitive conducts constitute an abuse of 
dominance and a violation of European antitrust rules (in modern connotation 
Article 102 TFEU).  
 
Furthermore, the Commission criticized the internal decision making and ap-
peal procedures of FIA, in particular with respect to a lack of transparency. The 
exclusion of ordinary courts for appeals against FIA decisions was also down-
turned. 
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Eventually, and in order to heal the anticompetitive effects, the European 
Commission (2001b; Cygan 2007a: 86-88, 2007b: 1341-1343) established that 
FIA must  
 
I. establish a complete separation of the commercial and regulatory functions 
in relation to the FIA Formula One World Championship and the FIA 
World Rally Championship;  
II. improve transparency of decision making and appeals procedures and cre-
ate greater accountability; 
III. guarantee access to motor sport to any person meeting the relevant safety 
and fairness criteria; 
IV. guarantee access to the international sporting calendar and ensure that no 
restriction is placed on access to external independent appeals; 
V. modify the duration of free-to-air broadcasting contracts in relation to the 
FIA Formula One World Championship with a maximum duration of three 
years (reduced from five years). 
 
Fundamentally, the Commission’s remedies focus on two issues: (i) unbundling 
the tying in of all relevant factors necessary to organize a motor racing champi-
onship by breaking up the exclusivity contracts and by enjoining the related 
contractual penalties, and (ii) separating the regulatory management of the 
prime world championships from the commercial management in order to de-
motivate any conflict of interest.  
 
Reducing the scope for discriminating exclusivity contracts represents a some-
what ‘ordinary’ limitation of the strategic options of enterprises with strong 
market dominance – like, for instance, in the famous Microsoft case – and as 
such is rather unproblematic. The new methodology (see section 2.2.2) would 
not have changed the assessment since this type of long-run discriminating ex-
clusivity contracts with prohibitive contractual penalties can hardly be viewed 
to be inherent to organizing a world championship in four-wheel motor racing. 
Next to violating the inherence principle, the massive restrictions of the strate-
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gic business freedom of circuit owners, teams, manufacturers and drivers addi-
tionally fails to respect the proportionality principle. 
 
The more difficult part of the Commission’s decision in this respect refers to 
the underlying objective of FIA’s contractual policy. Does the prevention of a 
rival series represent a legitimate or an illegitimate objective for a governing 
sports association? In the FIA case, the Commission clearly views the deter-
rence of a rival series to the FIA Formula One World Championship to be anti-
competitive (Cygan 2007a, 2007b) and, thus, implicitly to represent an illegiti-
mate objective. However, Commission acknowledges that the specificities of 
sport include the acceptance of the ‘monopolistic pyramid structure’ of sports 
organization and the need for an umbrella cooperation of all participants in 
terms of regulation and the creation of a single-entity championship, league or 
tournament (see section 2.2.1). Furthermore, when assessing the competitive ef-
fects of centralized marketing, the Commission puts weight on the efficiency 
effects from having one single top-tier league, championship or tournament (see 
sections 2.2.4 and 3.3). Nowhere in the football cases, for instance, the Com-
mission asks for opening up the structures for a rival championship, neither in 
terms of regulatory management nor in terms of commercial management. Un-
fortunately, the issue of the benefits and deficiencies of rival championships on 
the premium level of sports has not received much attention in the sports eco-
nomics and management research literature. Four-wheel motor racing offers an 
illustrative example why such a research would warrant some effort. Probably 
in contrast to established ball sports disciplines, the question of what constitutes 
a rival series is not that obvious in motor racing. Does an open wheel single-
seater cars world championship compete with a sports cars world champion-
ship? And the latter with a touring car world championship? Does the Ameri-
can-based but internationally expanding Indycar series (another open wheel 
single-seater format) represent a competitive threat to Formula One? What 
about sprint vs. endurance race formats? Do the feeder categories GP2, GP3, 
Renault World-Series, Formula Two, Formula 3 Euroseries, Auto GP, Indy-
Lights, Formula Nippon, etc. compete with each other and belong to the same 
 
29 
market? Interesting market definition issues surface that prevent a trivial answer 
to the legitimacy question of the association’s objective of preventing a ‘rival’ 
series.18 
 
This non-trivial issue leads over to the second prerogative of the Commission’s 
intervention into motor racing, namely the separation of regulatory management 
and commercial management. For instance, Cygan (2007a: 89-92) remains 
skeptical whether the Commission’s intervention has brought a substantial 
change in television rights policy. The Commission’s obligations were imple-
mented by (i) separating FIA (regulatory agency) and FOA (Formula One Ad-
ministration Ltd.; commercial management) for the then-running Concorde 
Agreement (until 2008). Bernie Ecclestone, effectively controlling FOA (Euro-
pean Commission 2001a: 169/5), stepped down as a FIA Vice-President in or-
der to dissolve the personal inter-linkage as well.19 Furthermore, FIA and the 
Formula One Group (FOG; CEO: Bernie Ecclestone),20 draw up a 100 year con-
tract handing the commercial rights for the FIA Formula One World Champi-
onship exclusively to FOG from 2010-2110 (European Commission 2006: 3). 
This new construction was accepted by the Commission following a monitoring 
period (European Commission 2003b). According to Cygan (2007a, 2007b), the 
‘new’ commercial rights holder basically continues the previous policies. In 
particular, the low revenue participation of teams and other stakeholders via the 
Concorde Agreement is continuing or has only very modestly improved. Cygan 
(2007a: 89-93) further conjectures that substantially nothing has changed re-
garding the common interest of regulatory authority (FIA) and commercial 
promoter (FOA/FOG) to prevent the establishment of a rival series to F1. Inso-
                                                          
18  The comparatively few treatments in sports economics and management highlight the benefits 
of a league or championship monopoly (inter alia, Fort & Quirk 1997; Rascher 2010: 29-34; 
cf. Ross 1995: 733-753) – but without exploring the difficult market definition issue that may 
emerge outside the usual football-baseball-basketball analyses. 
19  Bernie Ecclestone, nevertheless, became a member of the all-important FIA World Motor 
Sport Council as a ‘team representative’. 
20  http://www.cvc.com/Content/EN/OurCompanies/CompanyDetails.aspx?PCID=737; retrieved 
2010-12-12 at 15.31. 
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far, the separation of genuine sporting regulation and commercial management 
appears to be void in hindsight. Cygan (2007a: 91, 93) refers to the example of 
the 2006 manufacturers breakaway series threat, motivated predominantly by 
the low revenue shares from the commercial revenue of marketing F1. “It is no 
coincidence that, in March 2006, new safety regulations, improved provisions 
for revenue distribution between the teams and the sale of the commercial rights 
for 2008 onwards were all concluded at a time when FIA was seeking to avoid 
a competitor series being established. These arrangements will compose the 
new Concorde Agreement which the teams have signed in September 2006 to 
participate in Formula One beyond this date” (Cygan 2007a: 93). The break-
away controversy between the team organization FOTA (Formula One Teams 
Association) on the one side and FIA & FOG on the other side offers another 
prime example – and, again, the establishment of a rival series was successfully 
deterred. 
 
From today’s perspective, it appears to be somewhat doubtful whether the en-
forced separation of commercial management and governing authority stands in 
line with the post-2007 sports competition policy of the Commission. And even 
before that the Commission took a different stance with respect to European 
football where it confirmed a neutral position towards the organization of 
commercial management within or outside the regulatory sports associations 
(Toft 2006: 6-7). From a competition economics perspective, a 100 year con-
tract handing the commercial rights monopoly to a private profit-oriented com-
pany might actually raise more competition concerns than a the conflict of in-
terests that the Commission (probably ineffectively) tried to eliminate. It is cer-
tainly difficult to see why FOG should behave under more effective competitive 
pressure than FIA-FOA pre-2001. However, the influence of the share- and 
stakeholders of Formula One on the exploitation and utilization of the commer-
cial rights revenues has considerably decreased. 
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3.3. Centralized Marketing: the European Football Cases 
There have been three cases so far where the Commission has dealt with the 
centralized marketing of sports media rights by football associations. The first 
one was the UEFA Champions League case in 2003, the second one the English 
Premier League case (2002 – 2004) and the third one the Bundesliga case in 
2005. While the handling and the decision of these football-related cases dem-
onstrate a coherent and comparably clear-cut policy (see section 2.2.4), three in-
teresting issues surface at a closer look: (i) the economic reasoning of the effi-
ciency effects, (ii) the comparison to the treatment of centralized marketing in 
other sports disciplines, and (iii) the coherence with exemplary decisions by 
Member State authorities. Due to space limitations, these aspects can only be 
sketched in the context of this paper. However, this suffices for demonstrating 
that the framework for media rights selling strategies of sports associations may 
not be so unambiguous as it appears on first sight (see section 2.2.4). 
3.3.1. Economic Reasoning 
The economic reasoning of the Commission regarding the efficiencies justify-
ing an exemption of centralized marketing arrangements (following the condi-
tions outlined in section 2.2.4) embraces one interesting line of argument and 
interestingly dismisses another one. The single-point-of-sale argument appears 
to embrace an unorthodox transaction cost concept at first sight. Indeed, having 
a monopoly supplier reduces transaction costs in the sense that costs of search-
ing and selecting disappear. It would be a mistake in economic reasoning, how-
ever, to confuse ‘minimum transaction costs’ with ‘efficiency’. Competition in-
volves necessary transaction costs since it creates product and service diversity, 
allocative efficiencies as well as innovation and technological change. All these 
factors, however, improve consumer welfare despite the generated transaction 
costs – consumer welfare both in terms of lower prices and a consumer-
preferences-driven evolution of the product and the related services. Thus, argu-
ing that a single point of sale provides efficiencies due to the reduction of trans-
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action costs is a nonsense argument from a competition economics perspective 
and a dangerous reasoning. 
 
However, the Commission (European Commission 2007b: 83) argues a bit dif-
ferent. “The single point of sale enabled the acquisition of coverage for the 
whole UEFA Champions League season, allowing programming to be planned 
in advance. (…) [D]ue to the knock-out nature of the UEFA Champions League 
(…) a broadcaster could not know in advance which clubs would make it 
through to the end.” A decentralized sale of broadcasting rights, thus, would 
imply that the value of individually sold broadcasting rights “would plummet if 
that club was eliminated” (see additionally European Commission 2003a: rec. 
139-153). This reasoning emphasizes the knock-out character (cup system) of 
the UEFA Champions League (European Commission 2003a: rec. 145). And, 
indeed, the coverage of a whole cup is impossible to be sold in advance with a 
decentralized system since nobody knows in advance who will survive the 
knock-out rounds.21 However, two critical implications must be remarked. 
Firstly, this is true only for cup systems – and not for the English Premier 
League or the Bundesliga. Consequently, the efficiency reasoning would have 
to be different and ‘weaker’ for pure league systems than for such involving 
knock-out elements (cup systems, play-off elements, etc.). This is not reflected 
in the Commission’s decision practice. Secondly, it is not clear why the com-
plete coverage must be sold in advance of the season – and cannot be offered in 
sequences corresponding to the knock-out rounds. Selling all the rights in ad-
vance of the championship may follow a legitimate objective merely if it is in-
herent to create a common brand (insofar as this represents a legitimate objec-
tive). Then, however, the creation of an otherwise not available commonly-
branded and coherent league product represents the efficiency effect and refer-
ence to single-point-of-sale or (strange) transaction-cost reasoning is not neces-
sary since it does not add consumer welfare beyond the branding issue. 
 
                                                          
21  In addition, the Commission (2003a, rec. 146) claims that joint selling arrangements are neces-
sary to allow for comprehensive highlights programs of match-days. 
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The economic reasoning of the Commission does not employ the competitive 
balance improvement reasoning as a justification for exempting centralized 
marketing arrangements under an Article 101 (3) TFEU assessment (Kienapfel 
& Stein 2007: 12).22 This seems to be surprising at first sight since it belongs to 
the ‘textbook wisdoms’ of sports economics and management that striving for 
more competitive balance represents a legitimate task of any sports association 
(Rottenberg 1956; Fort & Quirk 1995; Groot 2008; Fort 2010: 155-199). 
Moreover, revenue-sharing may be a prime instrument in reducing competitive 
imbalance and centralized marketing arrangements offer avenues to distribute 
the centralized collected television revenues among the league participants in a 
way to promote competitive balance. In order to advocate the competitive bal-
ance defense, it is further necessary to point at the benefits for consumers (fans) 
due to a more balanced sporting competition. 
 
The reluctance of the Commission to embrace the competitive balance defense 
as a justification for antitrust exemptions, on the other hand, corresponds to a 
growing skepticism in the sports-economics literature, casting doubt on the in-
terrelation of ‘more balance’ and ‘more attractiveness’ (Peeters 2009; Paw-
lowski et al. 2010) as well as on the pro-balance incentive for league managers 
(Szymanski 2006) or even dismissing the competitive balance justification in to-
tal (Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Massey 2007). Still, given the comparatively con-
siderable weight that U.S. antitrust authorities are putting behind the competi-
tive balance defense, it seems surprising that it did not play a role in the Com-
mission decisions.  
3.3.2. Centralized Marketing in Different Sports Disciplines 
Regarding the look beyond football, it is interesting, that the Commission ac-
cepted centralized marketing of broadcasting rights without considerable obli-
                                                          
22  “The Commission nevertheless considers that it is not necessary for the purpose of this proce-
dure to consider the solidarity argument any further”. (European Commission 2003a: rec. 167; 
see also rec. 164-167). 
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gations (like competitive tendering, segmentation of rights, trustee supervision, 
etc.) in Formula One motor racing. This stands in sharp contrast to the football-
related decisions – and although it can be reasoned that it simply was an older 
decision, it remains remarkable that the Commission did not take this matter on 
the agenda again in the light of the football decisions. 
 
According to Cygan (2007a: 88), the Commission factually acknowledges with 
its decision that motor racing is different from football in the sense that motor 
sport viewers are interested in the chronological development of the champion-
ship throughout the season rather than in individual races. Regarding football, 
he conjectures the opposite, referring to the typical football fans’ loyalty to one 
team. Thus, football fans are alleged to be less interested in the unfolding of the 
championship and more in single, isolated games. In other words, while the 
Formula One World Championship is viewed to be one single event (and not 
consisting of individual races as single events), a football league is viewed to 
consist of individual games as single events. Such a reasoning might have some 
appeal with a view to the European Champions League (albeit a bit stuck in the 
philosophy of the older European cups). However, it appears to be rather doubt-
ful that the English Premier League or the German Bundesliga are less of an en-
tity than the Formula One World Championship.23  
 
Regarding the institutional framework for doing business, sports associations 
and its members should be aware that the clear guiding principles of section 
2.2.4 appear to be applicable only for ball sports leagues and can not necessar-
ily be transcribed to other sports disciplines or other types of championships 
and tournaments. 
                                                          
23  Note also that historically the Formula One World Championship and its predecessors devel-
oped from the idea of combining the most important Grand Prix races of a year into a champi-
onship classification. In this regard, a Grand Prix is much more a single event than one football 
match. 
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3.3.3. A Member State Curiosity? 
Eventually, the 2008 Bundesliga centralized marketing ‘case’ of the German 
Federal Cartel Office (FCO) serves as illustrative example for another tendency 
in marketing- and management-relevant competition policy practices in Europe. 
It is, however, not a formal decision case. Instead, the German football league 
(DFL; Deutsche Fußball Liga) submitted the plans for its centralized marketing 
concept for the seasons 2009 onwards in advance for scrutiny to the FCO. The 
FCO objected the submitted model and laid out detailed conditions for a rule-
conformal design (Bundeskartellamt 2208; Heitzer 2008). While most of the 
reasoning does not add to the preceding discussion of the Commission deci-
sions, one aspect stands out. The FCO put a lot of emphasis behind the impor-
tance of offering comprehensive highlights programs of match-days (see also 
above footnote 20). A prompt comprehensive highlights program broadcasted 
via free TV is viewed to limit the prices that Pay TV can charge the fans for 
live broadcasting. Disestablishing this type of program would harm consumer 
welfare by (i) eliminating the choice between two different product variants 
(pay television live broadcasting vs. free television comprehensive highlights 
program with a sufficiently small time delay) and (ii) increasing prices for pay 
television costumers (Heitzer 2008: 4). The FCO concludes that giving con-
sumers (fans) a fair share of the centralized marketing benefit requires the exis-
tence of free TV highlights programs broadcasted promptly after the matches 
have been played. This conclusion leads to detailed discussion of how to sched-
ule the matches between Friday to Sunday and the possible time slots of the re-
lated free TV highlights programs for the first and second division of German 
professional football. Inter alia, the FCO demanded (i) the maintenance of a 
core match-day (on Saturday) and (ii) prompt highlights programs in free TV. 
For instance, the core match-day on Saturdays (at least five out of nine matches 
per match-day; 15.30 – 17.15 o’clock) must be available for such a free TV 
comprehensive highlights program before 20.00 o’clock because such a pro-
gram during prime time (20.00 – 22.00 o’clock) is deemed to be unprofitable 
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and a late night highlights program (after 22.00 o’clock) is assessed to be con-
sumer-welfare harming (Bundeskartellamt 2008: 6-9; Heitzer 2008: 5-6). 
 
Without going into an analysis of the economic sense of these requirements, the 
interesting thing is the degree of detail of the intervention by the FCO. At the 
end of the day, the FCO and the DFL – in detail – negotiated about the time 
slots for the matches, the allocation of the matches over the weekend and the 
timing of different types of television coverage. It can hardly be the task of a 
competition authority enforcing competition rules to engage in such a detail 
regulation of management issues. However, this – admittedly extreme – exam-
ple stands in line with the tendency of competition policy in Europe to negotiate 
‘deals’ with the norm addressees and reach consensual solutions (commitments, 
settlements and remedies). This tendency is favored by the case-by-case ap-
proach, i.e. departing from a rule-based policy and moving towards detail-
assessments of each single case. While this may involve disadvantages for the 
enforcement power of competition policy (Budzinski 2010), it offers sports as-
sociations, clubs and related enterprises the option to reach favorable agree-
ments with the competition authorities. 
4. Conclusion 
The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents 
an important institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the 
courts, the 2007 overhaul of the approach and methodology has increased the 
scope of competition policy towards sports associations and clubs. Nowadays, 
virtually all activities of sports associations that govern and organize a sports 
discipline, which also includes business elements, are subject to antitrust rules. 
This includes genuine sporting rules that are essential for a league, champion-
ship or tournament to come into existence. Of course, ‘real’ business or com-
mercial activities like ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting rights, etc. also 
have to comply with competition rules. 
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In summary, regulatory activities of sports associations comply with European 
competition rules if they pursuit a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are 
inherent to that objective and proportionate to it (see section 2.2.2). This ‘new’ 
approach offers important orientation for the strategy choice of sports associa-
tions, clubs and related enterprises. Since this assessment is done following a 
case-by-case approach, however, neither a blacklist of anticompetitive sporting 
rules nor a whitelist of procompetitive ones can be derived. Instead, conclusions 
can be drawn only from the existing case decisions (see section 3.1 and 3.2) – 
but, unfortunately, this leaves many aspects open for future decisions. 
 
With respect to business activities, the focus of European competition policy is 
on centralized marketing arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute 
cartels and are viewed to be anticompetitive in nature. However, they may be 
exempted from the cartel prohibition on efficiency and consumer benefits con-
siderations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that centralized marketing 
arrangements must comply with in order to be legal (see section 2.2.4). Al-
though this policy seems to be well-developed at first sight, a closer look at the 
decision practice reveals several open problems (see section 3.3). Other areas of 
the buying and selling behavior of sports associations and related enterprises 
are considerably less well-developed and do not provide much orientation for 
business (see section 2.2.3). 
 
Eventually, the increasing importance of competition rules and policy for sports 
business is not yet reflected in the academic literature. In particular, economic 
analyses of the compliance of different types of (more or less genuine) sporting 
rules with the EC’s post-2007 assessment methodology as well as economic 
analyses focusing on other (‘European’) sports than football are lacking. Con-
sequently, the existing research predominantly displays a legal-science focus. 
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Appendix: List of EU Sports Cases 
Case classification:  
(I) the internal regulation of sport (genuine sporting rules or the rules of the 
game), 
(II) business practices (buying and selling behavior of sports enterprises, like 
ticketing arrangements, exclusivity contracts, etc),  
 (III) the sale of broadcasting rights (in particular the practice of bundling and 
joint-selling of the rights and the centralized marketing of a league or a cham-
pionship), and 
(IV) mergers. 
 
Case Year Sports Type Policy Area / Body Decision 
Walrave 1974 general I, II  internal mar-
ket rules / 
ECJ 
(i) sports is sub-
ject to community 
law only if it con-
stitutes a business 
activity, (ii) com-
position of na-
tional teams is 
not subject to na-
tionality antidi-
scrimination rules
Donà-Mantero 1976 Football I / exclusivity of 
national players in 
team sports 
internal mar-
ket rules / 
ECJ 
prohibition 
Eurovision 1989 - 
1993 
all III / internal provi-
sions on the acqui-
sition, exchange 
and contractual 
access to sports 
programs 
cartel policy; 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance with 
obligations 
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World Cup 
1990 Italy 
1992 Football II / package tours abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
infringement; no 
fines 
Tretorn Tennis 
Ball Suppliers 
1994 Tennis II / export ban on 
tennis balls 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
infringement; 640 
000 ECU fines 
(geographical 
market division) 
Bosman 1995 Football I / transfer rules 
and payments; li-
mitation to the 
number of foreign 
players 
internal mar-
ket rules, 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
prohibition of (i) 
transfer fees for 
out-of-contract 
players, (ii) limit 
to the number of 
EU players24 
FIFA Sports 
Goods 
1995 - 
2000 
Football I / standardization 
(technical specifi-
cations) of foot-
balls and licensing 
of products 
cartel policy, 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance 
Deliège 1996 - 
2000 
Judo I / selection and 
participation rules 
internal mar-
ket rules, 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
clearance (neces-
sary for the func-
tioning of the un-
derlying cham-
pionship) 
Lehtonen 1996 – 
2000 
Basketball I / transfer rules, 
esp. deadline for 
transfers (transfer 
windows) 
internal mar-
ket rules, 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
allowed subject to 
conditions (only 
if necessary for 
the functioning of 
the underlying 
championship) 
Danish Tennis 
Federation 
1998 Tennis II / sponsorship 
agreements be-
tween sports asso-
ciations and sports 
goods suppliers 
cartel policy, 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance with 
commitments 
                                                          
24  Confirmed in the Deutscher Handballbund (2003) and Simutenkov (2005) cases. 
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World Cup 
1998 France 
1998 - 
1999 
Football II / ticket sales ar-
rangements 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
prohibition; dis-
criminatory prac-
tices (unfair con-
ditions for non-
French residents) 
Mouscron Case 1999 Football I / ‘home and 
away’ rule 
internal mar-
ket and com-
petition rules 
/ ECJ 
clearance 
FIA  1999 – 
2001 
Motor Rac-
ing 
I, II, III / deter-
rence, rival series 
and promoters, 
marketing sys-
tems, commixture 
of sports rules and 
business practices 
abuse con-
trol, cartel 
policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments; 
monitoring until 
2003 
UEFA Euro 
2000 
2000 Football II / ticketing ar-
rangements 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
approval 
UEFA Broad-
casting Regula-
tions 
2000 - 
2001 
Football III / blocking of 
live broadcasting; 
protecting atten-
dance of lower-
level (amateur) 
leagues 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
out of scope 
UEFA Multiple 
Ownership  
2000 - 
2002 
Football I / prohibition of 
multiple owner-
ship 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
out of scope (in-
tegrity of sporting 
competition) 
UEFA Cham-
pions League  
 
2001 - 
2003 
Football III / joint-selling cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
Meca-Medina 2001 – 
2006 
Swimming; 
Olympic 
Games 
I / anti-doping 
rules 
abuse con-
trol, cartel 
policy, free 
movement / 
CFI, ECJ 
clearance  
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FIFA Transfer 
Rules 
2002 Football I / transfer rules internal mar-
ket rules; 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
investigation 
closed after 
commitments 
FAPL English 
Premier 
League  
2002 - 
2006 
Football III / joint-selling cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
Bayerische 
Landesbank / 
Formula One 
Group 
2002, 
2005 
Motor Rac-
ing 
IV / acquisition of 
commercial rights 
holder (initially 
together with JP 
Morgan Chase and 
Lehman Brothers) 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
Athens Olym-
pic Games 
2004  
2003 Olympic 
Games 
II / credit card ex-
clusivity 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance with 
commitments 
Bridgepoint / 
SVL / Holmes 
Place 
2003 Fitness IV / merger be-
tween fitness stu-
dio chains 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
Newscorp / Te-
lepíu (merger 
case involving 
SkyItalia) 
2003 Football IV merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
sports broadcast-
ing rights only 
one among many 
issues; main 
problem: insol-
vency-preventing 
merger  
DFB German 
Bundesliga  
2003 - 
2005 
Football III / marketing 
system 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
Cinven / BC 
Funds / Fitness 
First 
2003, 
2005 
Fitness IV / acquisition of 
an international 
fitness studio 
chain (first by 
Cinven, later by 
BC Funds) 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
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Sportfive / 
HSG / Stadion 
Frankfurt 
2004 Sports Fa-
cilities 
IV / merger be-
tween sports mar-
keting and sports 
facility operating 
companies 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
FIA / Vega 
Tyres 
2004 Motor Rac-
ing 
I / tyres regulation; 
establishing of a 
single tyre suppli-
er for karting se-
ries 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance 
Piau 2005 Football II / licensing rules 
for sports related 
services (here: 
players agents) 
abuse con-
trol, cartel 
policy, inter-
nal market 
rules / Com-
mission, CFI, 
ECJ 
clearance after 
commitments 
(only objective 
and transparent 
licensing systems 
are allowed)  
World Cup 
2006 Germany  
2005 Football II / credit card ex-
clusivity 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance with 
commitments  
CVC / SLEC  2006 Motor Rac-
ing 
IV / acquisition of 
FIA Formula One 
commercial rights 
holder  
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance with 
conditions and 
obligations 
Bridgepoint / 
Dorna 
2006 Motor Rac-
ing 
IV / acquisition of 
the FIM MotoGP 
commercial rights 
holder 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
MOTOE 2008 Motor 
Cycling 
II / business activi-
ties of non-profit 
organizations 
abuse control  
/ ECJ/  
European compe-
tition rules are 
applicable; na-
tional rules can-
not preclude this 
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Colony Capital 
/ Morgan Stan-
ley / Colfilm 
2008 Football IV / Colfilm is 
holding company 
of Paris Saint-
Germain Football 
SA 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
French Tennis  2009 Tennis I / anti-doping 
rules 
abuse control 
/ Commis-
sion 
clearance 
Daimler / IPIC 
/ Brawn GP 
2009 Motor Rac-
ing 
IV / engine suppli-
er of several teams 
acquires leading 
racing team 
merger con-
trol / Com-
mission 
clearance 
Olympique 
Lyon 
2010 Football I / transfer pay-
ments, compensa-
tion for young 
player education 
Internal mar-
ket rules / 
ECJ 
prohibition if 
compensation is 
unrelated to ac-
tual costs of train-
ing 
Sources: own compilation of data from http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/case_law.html 
and http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/decisions.html; retrieved 2011-01-24, 10:21. 
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